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
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as primary factors creating the potential for a defeat of the U.S. This paper emphasizes a number of actions to make the U.S. more proactive rather than reactive in the area of propaganda.



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## THE SILENT BATTLE

A Student Paper  
Prepared By  
LTC David E. Crew

April, 1982



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"Everyone will agree that an army which does not train itself to wield all arms, all means and methods of warfare that the enemy possesses or may possess is behaving in an unwise or even in a criminal manner. This applies to politics to a greater degree than it does to war. In politics it is harder to forecast what methods of warfare will be applied and be useful for us under certain future conditions. Unless we master all means of warfare, we stand the risk of suffering great and sometimes decisive defeat."

- N. Lenin -

#### INTRODUCTION

From the time that Karl Marx penned the Communist Manifesto to the present, the capitalistic free world has been at war with communism. The United States has fought two major wars with communist countries, armed itself for a strategic deterrent and has been preoccupied with atomic warfare and a surprise attack from the Soviet Union. Yet, through all of this, the United States might be losing an even greater battle. This is a silent battle, as we think of conflict with bombs and bullets. It is subtle and insidious. It is a war of words designed to outflank the United States by acquiring, if not the hearts and minds of the world, then at least world opinion in favor of Kremlin activities, while concurrently castigating the United States for its political responses.

The communist blueprint for world domination, at the very minimum, clearly portrays the total commitment to political warfare at all levels. (10:pg 1)

From the days of Marx and Lenin, the communists have been consistent and pragmatic in their approach and methodology of perpetuating and expanding their political beliefs. Their rhetoric may change, but their plans remain undaunted. The Honorable John J. Duncan, Congressman from Tennessee, placed their plans into perspective when we spoke before the United States Congress:

"In May of 1919 at Dusseldorf, Germany, the Allied Forces obtained a copy of the 'Communist Rules for Revolution.' Nearly fifty years later, the Reds are still following the rule. As you read the list, stop after each item and think about the present-day situation and where you live, and all around the nation.

- a. Corrupt the young, get them away from religion. Get them interested in sex. Make them superficial; destroy their ruggedness.
- b. Get control of all means of publicity thereby:
  - (1) Get people's minds off their government by focusing their attention on athletics, sexy books and plays, and other trivialities.
  - (2) Divide the people into hostile groups by constantly harping on controversial matters of no importance.
  - (3) Destroy the people's faith in their natural leaders by holding the latter up to contempt, ridicule and obloquy.
  - (4) Always preach true democracy, but seize power as fast and as ruthlessly as possible.
  - (5) By encouraging government extravagance, destroy its credit, produce fear of inflation with rising prices and general discontent.
  - (6) Forment unnecessary strikes in vital industries, encourage civil disorders and foster a lenient and soft attitude on the part of government towards such disorders.
  - (7) By specious argument, cause the breakdown of the old moral virtues, honesty, sobriety, continued faith in the pledged word, ruggedness.



- c. Cause registration of all firearms on some pretext, with a view of confiscating them and leaving the population helpless."

Congressman Duncan closed his remarks by saying "...These rules are so simple, so easy to carry out. We see results taking place..." (19:E1317)

The major political weapon used by the Soviet Union to perpetuate their plan is propaganda. In 1913 Stalin said, "Words are one thing, actions another. Good words are a mask for concealment of deeds." Fifty eight years later at the 1961 Fourth of July reception in the Moscow American Embassy, Khrushchev supported the earlier words of Stalin and emphasized that the Soviet plan had not changed one iota when he said, "My tongue is my secret weapon."

The United States stands as one of the most formidable road blocks in the path of the Soviet grand design -- world domination. It should then be no surprise that the United States has been picked out by Soviet propagandist as the top priority target. Every effort has been made to slander the United States abroad, to discredit this country in the eyes of foreign nations, and to eliminate any realized gains in our foreign policy. Even from within our ranks, the Soviet propagandist has been at work subverting our citizens to create a loss of faith in our institutions and to produce confusion over issues relating to our foreign policy -- especially those which deal with U. S. military relationships with other countries.

One might retort to the opening paragraphs of this paper that the reasoning, concerning the "Silent Battle" of communist propaganda, is a "Red Herring" and reeks of McCarthyisms and the 1950's. However,

have there been any events between the 1950's and now which lend credence to any claim that the Soviet Union has detoured from its aspirations -- world domination through the defeat of capitalism? "We will bury you" were the words of Nikita Khrushchev in 1956, when speaking to a group of foreign diplomats. In June the following year, Khrushchev bluntly stated before a wide-eyed American television audience:

"I can prophesy that your grandchildren in America will live under socialism. And please do not be afraid of that. Your grandchildren will...not understand how their grandparents did not understand the progressive nature of a socialistic society." (2:pg 1)

#### DEFINITIONS

Much has been written on the subject of propaganda. Each author has brought into the discussion his own definition of the subject. Each varies, but all possess a common thread of agreement that propaganda is for the purpose of redirecting the attitudes, beliefs, and feeling of the target population.

"Propaganda is any effort to change opinions or attitudes...The propagandist is anyone who communicates his ideas with the intent of influencing his listener." (1:pg xi)

"Propaganda is a manipulation of psychological symbols having goals of which the listener is not conscious. The aim to indoctrinate -- particularly in regard to political, economic, and social matters -- has been regarded as the hallmark of propaganda." (1:pg xi)

"Propaganda is the expression of opinions or actions carried out deliberately in individuals or groups with a view to influencing the opinions or actions of other individuals or groups for predetermined ends and through psychological manipulations." (1:pg xi)

"...technique of social pressure which tends to create psychological or social groups with an unified structure across homogeneity of the affective and mental status of the individuals under consideration." (1:pg xii)

"...an attempt to modify personalities and control the behavior of individuals in relation to the goals considered non-scientific or of doubtful value in a specific society and time period." (1:pg xii)

Webster's dictionary defines propaganda as: "The spreading of ideas, information, or rumor for the purpose of helping or injuring an institution, a cause, or a person; ideas, facts, or allegations spread deliberately to further one's cause or to damage an opposing cause." We have grown up as individuals and as a nation believing that propaganda is simply a series of lies -- total distortion of truth. However, "...modern propaganda has long disdained the ridiculous lies of the past and outmoded forms of propaganda. It operates instead with many different kinds of truth -- half truth, limited truth, truth of context. Even Gobbels always insisted that the Wehrmacht communiques be as accurate as possible." (7:pgV)

#### TOTALITARIAN CONTROL AND ITS ENVIRONMENT

Soviet propaganda is multi-dimensional in its effort. First and foremost, it is for the purpose of population control within the geopolitical boundaries of the U.S.S.R. The second, and no-less important dimension, focuses on the free world and the defeat of capitalism through propaganda. Lastly is the propaganda activity targeted on surrogate communist states under the Soviet umbrella.

Only the first two are essential for examination to acquire a modicum of understanding of the depth of the Kremlin's propaganda effort at home and abroad.

The Russian Revolution brought with it a new meaning to the definition of propaganda in the term "agitprop" -- propaganda mixed with agitation. Propaganda at that time meant the transmission of many ideas to a few people. Marxist-Leninist ideological propaganda was intended only for the cadre, to arm them with instructions for fulfilling their tasks and to stimulate their morale. Propaganda was not intended, nor directed, towards the masses. It was held that the masses were not educated sufficiently to comprehend complex issues. However, the masses could be awakened from their apathy through continuous repetition of singularly simple, emotional issues -- issues which played upon the frustrations of life and the basic needs for living. The Soviets early on recognized that "...modern propaganda cannot work without education. Education is not the best prophylactic against propaganda -- rather it is the absolute prerequisite for propaganda. Intellectuals are virtually the most vulnerable of all to modern propaganda for three reasons: (1) They absorb the largest amount of unverifiable information; (2) They feel a compelling need to have an opinion on every important question...; (3) They consider themselves capable of 'judging for themselves.' They literally need propaganda." (7:pg vi)

Today the distinction between propaganda and agitation is not as discernable. Propaganda has grown into themes and messages

propagated through the mass media and directed at a large population. Agitation has assumed a more face-to-face connotation involving preselected groups. Generally, mass communications emphasize the broader message of the movement and agitation assumes the responsibility of interpreting such messages and relating them to specific individuals under specific conditions/circumstances. (7:pg 70)

To ensure specific messages relating to specific circumstances being published by the mass media, the Soviets quickly enhanced an already existing office of censorship. Before the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, less than half the population could read or write. The Soviets correctly perceived that such conditions could not continue if they were to achieve a high degree of industrialization and to make major scientific advancements. After the revolution, a concentrated effort was initiated to reduce the illiteracy rate within the Soviet Union. By 1973, they claimed a 98% literacy rate. (13:pg 762) As more and more Russians learned to read, the Communist Party stepped up its publication of propaganda and increased its censorship controls. Without permission from the Office of Censorship, no newspaper can be issued, no book or pamphlet printed, no broadcast made, no lecture delivered, or exhibition opened.

Lenin stated that freedom of speech and press would be possible only after capitalism was defeated, a classless society was developed, and the state disappeared. Stalin reinforced Lenin's viewpoint when he told the Communist Party that no policy of universal freedom of

speech and press could exist in the Soviet Union. In 1927, Stalin twisted truth and logic when he said that freedom of the press did not exist in capitalistic countries because property owners (capitalists) controlled the newspapers. But, he said freedom of speech did exist in the Soviet Union because the dictatorship of the proletariat controlled the newspapers.

There is no doubt that the newspapers are controlled. Pravda (meaning truth) "the world's largest newspaper (its circulation is nearly 11 million)" is the Communist Party's official voice. Thus a dichotomy is established, not only in the name PRAVDA, but even more so in Soviet rhetoric. Control hardly comes from the average member of the working class, which ostensibly constitutes the proletariat. The party line to which Pravda rigidly adheres (like glue on fly paper) is received from the propaganda department of the central committee -- hardly the average member of the working class. Truth cannot be dictated by a few.

The second most important newspaper, Izvestia (meaning "The News"), is the voice of the Soviet government. All other papers in the U.S.S.R. are under the Party's domination. The Soviet government also controls Russian magazines and books. It owns and operates all radio and television stations. Thus the Kremlin has a "built-in" conduit through which pours out the Party propaganda. (11:pg 215)

Soviet newspapers carry no advertising, contain a preponderance of editorial items and are relatively small in size. Little information is published concerning events occurring outside the Soviet Union. Non-political events within the Soviet Union receive

little attention. For example, a Soviet Aeroflot jet crash which kills a large number of people is not newsworthy. A crash in 1973 received only 27 words worth of attention on the back page. But, what is considered "big news" is the work of members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. According to Soviet officials, readers of newspapers must "know something new and good." (6:pg 216-217)

Over the years the Soviet citizen, and even communist newsmen, seem to have accepted the axiom of publishing/broadcasting and reading/listening to "something new and good." There is nothing wrong with that -- we could use a little of the same in the United States news media, especially when all we read and hear are bleak items of crime, corruption, and calamity -- but, total censorship is obviously wrong.

"The will of the Party is that the newspapers, radio, television, movies, and the arts all help to convey the Party line. The newspapers have by far the biggest role in this process. The Party line is more important than the facts about any situation described. When the facts don't conform to the line, the line prevails. They (journalists) are agents of the Central Committee, and know their place. 'We are never embarrassed to admit that we express the will of the Party,' the editor of Party Life told me." (11:pg 220)

A Pavlovian technique of conditioning the Soviet citizenry has existed since the Bolshevik Revolution. It is not a haphazard plan, but rather one which is detailed, consistent, and with rigid guide lines. Censorship is part of the technique and is meant to control the thinking of the Soviet people. Government controlled media is heavily based on omission. Robert G. Kaiser, while in

Moscow, obtained a partial list of censor's forbidden topics.

"The list speaks very well for itself. Here are some of the items that the censor in each newspaper office must keep out of his newspaper:

- \* The itineraries of trips and locations of stopovers or speeches of members and candidate members of the politburo.
- \* Information about the organs of Soviet censorship which discloses the character, organization and method of their work.
- \* Activities of the organs of state security and Soviet intelligence organs...
- \* ...The amount of crime, the number of people engaged in criminal behavior, the number arrested, the number convicted...
- \* Information about the existence of correctional labor camps...
- \* Facts about the physical condition, illness and death rates of all prisoners in all localities.
- \* The number of illiterate people.
- \* Reports about the human victims of accidents, wrecks and fires...
- \* Information about the consequences of catastrophic earthquakes, tidal waves, floods, and other natural calamities...
- \* Calculations of the relative purchasing power of the ruble and the hard currency of foreign states.
- \* The size of the total wage fund (that is, wages paid to the population), or the amount of money which comprises the population's purchasing power, or the balance of income and expenditure of the population.
- \* Information about hostile actions by the population or responsible officials of foreign states against representatives or citizens of the U.S.S.R.
- \* The correlation between the cost of services for foreign tourists in the U.S.S.R. and the selling price of tourist trips in the U.S.S.R.



- \* Information about the export to foreign countries of arms, ammunition, military technology, military equipment...
- \* Information suggesting a low moral-political condition of the armed forces, unsatisfactory military discipline, abnormal relations among soldiers or between them and the population...
- \* The number of drug addicts...
- \* Information about occupational injuries.
- \* Information about the audibility of the radio stations of foreign states in the U.S.S.R.
- \* Information about the duration of all-union (i.e., nationwide) training sessions for athletes; information about the rates of pay for athletes; information about the money prizes for good results in sports competitions; information about the financing, maintenance and staff of athletic teams..." (11:pg 224-225)

This paper opened with the statement that propaganda was a major weapon system in political warfare. It has a parallel with a military action. In armed warfare when "...without that complete support of public opinion, the economic and manpower mobilization would not be possible...Propaganda and censorship are necessary in any overall mobilization plan." (6:pg 372) Herein lies the parallel between political and military warfare -- for it is absolutely essential in a protracted political war, between major nation-states, to acquire and maintain favorable public opinion. Otherwise, it could not be sustained. The Kremlin has mobilized the Soviet population for political war between communism and capitalism.

#### BEYOND SOVIET BORDERS

Having discussed the general nature of propaganda and censorship techniques as they apply within the Soviet Union, it is now pertinent to examine the second dimension of Soviet propaganda --

that which is directed, in an ever increasing tempo, to Free World audiences. To view the Kremlin's effort only in terms of "big lie tactics, mass hypnosis, and blatant promises of material betterment" is to underestimate Soviet capabilities and the importance attached to their effort. Soviet propaganda has taken on more attributes and is directed to much deeper ends than the Free World once believed possible or gave the Kremlin credit for being able to accomplish. (As a matter of fact, the Free World, until recently, was rather naive as to the extent of the Soviet effort. There are some to whom it is still beyond their sensibilities that the Soviet Union would ever stoop so low or would ever consider such perpetrations.)

Propaganda targeted against the Free World is based upon Soviet experiences with captive audiences and recruits to Kremlin communism. Extensive use is made of local elements and Soviet agents in the target country to spread the gospel according to Moscow. These resources manipulate the free press, produce forged "official" papers, induce political and economic cooperations with Moscow, exploit academicians and journalists, and act as agents of disinformation. Some activities are carried out secretly and frequently violate the laws of other nations. (18:pg 1)

In 1979, Soviet officials circulated rumors that the United States supported the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. When the United States Embassy was burned in Islamabad, Soviet disinformation agents accused the Pakistani Army. In 1981, the Soviets claimed the United States caused the death of Panama's Omar Torrijos.

In 1982, the Soviet Tass News Agency suggested that the United States crystalized the dispute between Argentina and Great Britain over the Falkland Islands. The Soviet objective is simple -- to increase anti-American sentiment and to exacerbate diplomatic ties between the United States and its friends and allies. (18:pg 1)

The Soviets seek every opportunity to take advantage of open societies of the industrialized states. Unrestricted access to a democratic country's news media creates ideal conditions for the Kremlin to disseminate their policies. Such policies are couched in terms that give the impression that Soviet objectives are synchronous with those of the Free World.

The Kremlin maintains a high degree of flexibility in its political tactics and the employment of propaganda. A change in the use of propaganda normally reflects a change in the international situation. During interludes between world tensions and moments of crisis, the Soviets frequently intensify their efforts to discredit opponents of the Soviet Union, attempt to fragment long standing traditions and values and create division and strife among the world leaders.

A large portion of anti-American propaganda originating from the Kremlin is overt. When Brezhnev or some other Soviet official denounces U. S. political/military policy, the source is easily fixed and quickly countered. On the other hand, disinformation -- the seeding of rumors, insinuations, and distortions of fact -- is extremely difficult to neutralize. (18:pg 1) A favorite disinformation operation is to plant "news" items in foreign publications,

then reprint them in the Soviet press. This allows Moscow to cite foreign sources in order to mask their culpability and to build a credible distortion to sway world opinion.

The Soviets have made extensive use of forgeries to further their effort in the act of disinformation. These forgeries are completely fabricated or altered versions of actual documents which are circulated to mislead foreign governments, media, and world opinion. The KGB has accumulated over the years samples of U. S. State Department cables, internal CIA memorandums, classified military manuals, NATO correspondence, etc. All of this material (gathered by KGB agents in the West) and extensive studies on paper fibers and watermarks, routing procedures, and type faces have enabled the Kremlin to produce forgeries of convincing quality. In 1979, a Muslim magazine located in Cairo, Egypt, published a phony CIA document which discussed ways and means to bribe Islamic group members who were opposed to the Camp David peace process. Also in 1979, a Syrian newspaper published a letter, ostensibly from Hermann Eilts, United States Ambassador to Egypt. This letter was urging the Director of CIA to "repudiate" Egypt's Anwar Sadat and to "get rid of him without hesitation." Once a forgery is in print, copies are picked up throughout the world which ultimately means millions of readers. The Soviets play on the gullibility of world readers, to include citizens of the United States, for success to be achieved in their forgery operations. (12:pg 52-53)

Front groups provide another arena for the employment of Soviet disinformation tactics. The effectiveness of these organizations comes from the fact that most are not openly aligned to the communist party. As such, they possess the ability to attract a membership cutting across the entire political spectrum. Masking their pro-Soviet alignment, these groups establish alliances with well-intentioned assemblages within a nation to participate in causes that have been judged to be in the best interest of the Soviet Union. Multi-national contacts provide these organizations a foundation for engaging in direct activities in many western nations. Not only are these groups active participants in disinformation, but they also work to create open opposition to a nation's policies which could be deleterious to Soviet objectives. (18:pg 2)

The Soviets also make extensive use of "clandestine" radio broadcasts that purport to originate from within a particular region of the target country. Actually, these signals are transmitted from the Soviet Union or an allied country. For example, during the American hostage crisis in Iran, "The National Voice of Iran" (located in the Soviet Union) consistently transmitted broadcasts exhorting continued holding of the American hostages. At the same time, the official Soviet position catered to the majority of world opinion in that the hostages' claim of diplomatic immunity must be upheld. (18:pg 2)

The Kremlin never misses opportunities to increase insurgency activities, where they exist, and to discredit United States efforts

to assist an indigenous government in its fight against an insurgency. El Salvador is the most recent case in point. In 1980, the Salvadorian Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) was organized to represent the leftist insurgency abroad. The FDR was immediately provided Soviet and Cuban support. The United Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) is a central political and military planning organization for the El Salvador insurgents. The DRU covertly collaborates with the FDR. Both organizations are scrupulous in their efforts to conceal their relationships with the Soviets and Cubans -- their goal is to represent themselves as fully independent Salvadorian movements. The FDR has experienced a degree success in establishing Salvadorian Solidarity Committees in Western Europe, Latin America, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The puppet committees have disseminated propaganda and organized meetings and demonstrations in support of the El Salvador insurgency forces. In cooperation with local communist parties and leftist groups, approximately 70 demonstrations and protests occurred between January and March, 1981 in Western Europe, Latin American, Australia, and New Zealand. These organizations have succeeded in influencing public opinion throughout Latin America and Western Europe. To their credit, the insurgent claim to legitimacy have been reinforced by acquiring intense diplomatic activity on behalf of the insurgents.

(18:pg 3)

#### POINT AND COUNTERPOINT

Compared to the Soviet propaganda machine, the United States effort is essentially stillborn. The CIA estimates the Soviet Union

spends 3.3 billion dollars annually on its propaganda activities. Included is 700 million dollars for Radio Moscow (the Kremlin's overt radio station), 150 million dollars for the Communist Party's international activities, and 550 million dollars for the Tass News Agency which spreads Moscow's view of world events. By contrast, the U. S. International Communication Agency (ICA) is held to a budget of 448 million dollars. The ICA is the primary United States agency charged with coordinating the United States propaganda effort. Even with the addition of 87 million dollars, that which is separately spent for Radio Free Europe, the total United States budget to counter Soviet propaganda and to initiate a comparative few offensive programs only amounts to approximately 15% of the Soviet expenditure. (15:pg 15)

In monetary terms, the United States propaganda effort made a quantum leap forward when the budget nearly doubled in fiscal year 1979. But United States progress has since stagnated while the Soviets continue to surge forward relatively unopposed. The fiscal year budgets for 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981 were 286 million dollars, 411 million dollars, 426 million dollars, and 449 million dollars respectively. (2:pg 1619; 3:pg 2730; 4:pg 2010; 5:pg 2140)

Over the last two decades the United States commitment to active propaganda operations has oscillated between total neglect and half hearted attention. The 1960's began at a peak with the words of President John F. Kennedy when he addressed the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington, D.C. on 20 April 1961:

"...it is clear that the forces of communism are not to be underestimated in Cuba or anywhere else in the world. If the self-discipline of the free cannot match the iron discipline of the mailed fist

in economic, political, scientific, and all other kinds of struggle as well as military, then the peril to freedom will continue to rise.

...it is clearer than ever that we face a relentless struggle in every corner of the globe that goes far beyond the clash of armies or even nuclear armaments.

...we dare not fail to see the insidious nature of this new and deeper struggle. We dare not to grasp the new concept, the new tools, the new sense of urgency, we will need to combat it...

...too long we have fixed our eyes on traditional military needs; on armies prepared to cross borders; on missiles poised for flight. Now it should be clear that this is no longer enough; that our security may be lost piece by piece, country by country, without firing a single missile or crossing a single border.

...We intend to intensify our efforts for a struggle in many ways more difficult than war..."

The words of President Kennedy may well have been the first White House recognition that the United States was in a war of words. Kennedy indicated that the United States was entering the "war" to safeguard United States national security. However, this commitment seems to have been soon forgotten. The President was assassinated and the Vietnam war took on a new perspective. By the end of the sixties, Vietnam had significantly reduced this country's zest for any type of warfare. The beginning of detente also eliminated the once pressing need to convert the Soviets to a different philosophy. As a result, officials of the United States Information Agency (the old name for ICA) worked in relatively unnoticed settings for over ten years. Renewed international tensions in the late



1970's revitalized the moribund character of the United States information programs. (14:pg 676)

Two things become evident about the United States information/propaganda effort. First, it floats on the tide of United States presidential leadership. Only the president has the ultimate decision, other than the dollar appropriations, as to how extensive the United States programs will be. For it is only within the oval office that all the factors impacting on United States foreign policy are synthesized with the chief executive's goals, personal opinions and inner feelings. Such decisions are as much based on personal feelings as they are facts. The evidence for this rests in the single fact that the United States has had five presidents, since John Kennedy, with five separate programs. Concurrently, one single fact has been common throughout all the different presidential administrations -- the Soviets have never decreased their political war and the employment of propaganda.

The second evident conclusion is that the United States is a master of reaction rather than proaction. In other words, this nation waits for situations to develop before it takes any counter measures. It does not, at least in the arena of world-wide propaganda, attempt to remain ahead of the pressures of Soviet instigated crisis situations. As a result, reactions are frequently too late to cope with a specific situation. Admittedly it is difficult at best to second guess what is going to happen "tomorrow." Yet adequately strong consistency, in the face of a dogmatic adversary, does possess the potential to reduce the number and frequency of crisis situations.

Four years ago ICA was known as the United States Information Service. This agency coordinates all United States activities which are centered on the Voice of America (VOA), cultural exchanges, films, speakers, exhibits, and other aspects relating to United States "diplomacy." ICA sponsored radio stations transmit for about 1800 hours a week in 45 languages -- mostly to East European countries and the Soviet Union. Again, in contrast, the U.S.S.R. transmits over 2000 hours per week in 82 languages to almost every one of the world's 165 countries. (15:pg 15)

Recently, President Reagan appointed a new ICA director, California businessman Charles Wick. While it is entirely within the purview of presidential prerogatives to appoint new members to his staff, it seems somewhat perfidious to appoint an individual with little or no background. This is especially true when the ICA director's Soviet counterpart is a careerist with extensive experience in Soviet propaganda. When in a military war, no one ever thinks of appointing a banker to general armies in the field. With the intensity of the "Silent Battle" of words and the stakes involved, should not this war then be directed by a professional -- by a master of the art?

It seems that propaganda is regarded as an evil practice within a democratic society. That same attitude plus a sense of fair-play seems to prevail even when we are at close quarters with our communist opponents. VOA has perhaps gone overboard in its objectivity. Air time was given to Soviet officials who challenged United States weapons policies.

India serves as a good case study for a comparative analysis of the United States effort in countering the Soviets. American aid to India was reduced in the early 1970's. Instead of the United States propaganda effort increasing to fill the void, it too was reduced. But the Soviets saw a prime opportunity and they took it. Increased radio broadcasts now provide the Soviets with an effort almost double that of the United States. The Soviet magazine SOVIET LAND is published in twelve languages (Indian dialects), and is distributed in numbers eight times more than the United States publication SPAN. The United States makes available 200 books and six academic texts. Conversely, the Soviets list some 2200 books in their catalogue of available publications. Not only do the Soviets distribute propaganda tracts but, they also offer educational texts such as medical books for as low as \$1.10 per copy. The Soviets concentrate on traveling to remote regions in India to participate in local festivals, etc. The United States effort is narrow in scope limiting itself to about 6000 individuals of the urban and political elite. Observers have commented that the Soviets are building a pro-people image while the United States image has been identified as being capitalistic, imperial and elitist. (15:pg 18) The United States may view India as a success. However, the true measurement of the United States effort may best be seen through the eyes of an Indian citizen:

"The United States builds schools and spreads literacy amongst the peasants. The U.S.S.R. supplies them with books and the newspapers they read. The United States gives scholarships to students for studies abroad. The U.S.S.R. sells them cheap political glasses through which they survey the world. The United States spends money on library premises.

The U.S.S.R. manages to get on the shelves inside with her own choice of literature. The United States builds hospitals and furnishes them with soft beds and ultramodern gadgets. The U.S.S.R. indoctrinates the nurses and the doctors. The United States creates factories for the workers to earn a livelihood. The U.S.S.R. bands them together into trade unions, trains their leaders, and gives them a cause to die for. The United States pampers regime after regime with paraphernalia for pomp and power. The U.S.S.R. trains an elite capable of capturing power in every land." (10:pg 8)

What is the result of the United States effort in India?

Former United States Ambassador Robert Goheen was interviewed by Time Magazine. Goheen was born in India and thus has a high degree of country knowledge. He feels that ICA has accomplished a credible job with limited resources. However, he said, "The Soviets have created an image of a country that is non-threatening and supportive of India. Because of a record of more than 30 years, Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean are perceived as benign, whereas American ships raise the threat of superpower confrontation." (15:pg 18)

#### CONCLUSIONS

The threat to national security through the loss of a propaganda war is great. Ambassador Goheen's comments about India's perceptions drives home the point that without the support of foreign governments, the United States is slowly being choked off, its presence unwelcomed, and its image as a credible world leader left to flounder.

As long as the United States is geared only to respond to Soviet propaganda initiatives and is not willing to do more than

propagate words to endear and persuade -- without any action -- it can expect to lose the battle. The winner of the "Silent Battle" will find doors open to the third world countries -- countries rich in natural resources and strong in numbers. But those doors will only open to the nation that provides more than mere words without follow through. Doors will open to the country that caters to the mind rather than to gadgets and gimmicks.

The words of President John Kennedy are more poignant today than they were 21 years ago. Our effort must be more than just the creation of a channel of communications used in a public relations manner towards a general political objective of national prestige. The Soviets effort is purposeful, designed to achieve specific objectives.

A central office must be established, staffed with experienced, career personnel. Did Secretary of State Haig play into the Soviet's propaganda hand when he spoke about demonstrative nuclear explosions in Europe? Did President Reagan feed the Soviet propaganda machine when he mentioned that the employment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe would not lead to a strategic nuclear war? These questions and many more should be studied and evaluated by top government officials -- officials charged with the responsibility of initiating propaganda and countering the Soviet effort. No such office exists at this time. ICA operates essentially in a vacuum -- little coordination between the White House and CIA.

Finally, we must overcome our reservations concerning the employment of propaganda. In a military conflict, our forces are expected to "kill people and break things." An army is expected to employ all

the weapons provided by its government to ensure victory.

The commander who only maneuvers his infantry without support from artillery is negligent. Is a political war any different?

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